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The DFID-ESRC Growth Research Programme (DEGRP) produces a range of knowledge products aimed 
at linking the research of DEGRP to a number of research and policy debates on the following themes: 
agriculture; financial markets; and innovation and growth. This paper relates to the innovation theme 
and draws together a number of essays that emerged from two sessions on state-business relations and 
industrial policy during the 2013 UN University-World Institute for Development Economics Research 
(UNU-WIDER) Conference on 24-25 June in Helsinki, Finland: ‘L2C – Learning to Compete: Industrial 
Development and Policy in Africa’. 
 
The links between state-business relations and industrial policy are central to specific areas in the second 
call for DEGRP research: ‘Institutions, Industrial Policy and Productivity Growth’. This paper includes 
contributions by leading experts on state-business relations and industrial policy including Lars Buur, 
Benjamin Herzberg, Margaret McMillan, John Page, Dani Rodrik, Kunal Sen, Lili Sisombat, Dirk Willem 
te Velde and Lindsay Whitfield. We are grateful to Hubert Schmitz for his comments on this paper with 
respect to informal state-business relations. 
 
The essays argue that: 
 
 One important role for industrial policy is to raise aggregate productivity by increasing the 
share of manufacturing in the economy and by ensuring that resources flow faster into 
manufacturing sectors. 
 
 The appropriate institutional setting matters greatly for designing effective industrial policy. 
A broad understanding of how industrial policy can be supported by appropriate institutional 
settings is advancing. Conducive factors discussed in the essays include mechanisms that: enable 
transparency, ensure the likelihood of reciprocity, increase the credibility of the state among 
capitalists and establish high levels of trust between public and private agents; mutual interests, 
pockets of efficiency, learning for productivity; embeddedness, discipline and accountability; and 
commitment, focus, experimentation and feedback.  
 
 However, research has advanced far less in understanding the details of such factors. High 
quality evidence on state-business relations using long-runs of data is often lacking.  More needs 
to be done to help understand more precisely the factors behind improved industrial policy-
making that can help innovation and raise productivity growth.  
 
 More generally,  this set of essays suggests several areas of further policy research:  




- Which state-business relations principles matter most? Systematic analysis on the 
characteristics of effective state-business relations across case studies in low-income countries 
(LICs) (e.g. historical institutionalist empirical studies on successful economic functions of 
state-business relations) examining how they affect policy for innovation and productivity 
change. 
- Which forms of state-business relations help the most? Examination of the practice of state-
business relations by comparing across locations a few selective indicators that can be 
measured objectively. 
- Bringing the two areas above together: Which combinations of state-business relations 
practices and principles are more conducive to good policy-making, innovation and 
productivity growth?  Do they differ when focusing on short-term gains rather than long-








1. Introduction and 
overview 
Dirk Willem te Velde, Overseas Development Institute 
 
DEGRP funds world-class scientific research on issues relating to economic growth in low-income 
countries (LICs), with high potential for impact on policy and practice. In addition, the programme aims 
to ensure evidence is used to develop the capacity to undertake and use research in developing 
countries, and has an impact on growth policy. 
 
DEGRP will produce a range of knowledge products aimed at linking the research of the programme to 
a number of research and policy debates on the following themes: agriculture; financial markets; and 
innovation and growth. This set of essays has emerged from two sessions on state-business relations and 
industrial policy during the 2013 UNU-WIDER Conference on 24-25 June in Helsinki, Finland: ‘L2C – 
Learning to Compete: Industrial Development and Policy in Africa’. 
  
This paper relates to DEGRP’s innovation theme. The programme has commissioned research on 
innovation and productivity in LICs under the first ESRC/DFID growth call to: (i) understand innovation 
better; and (ii) examine appropriate institutional and policy factors behind innovation. The second 
DEGRP call for research covers, among others, the following areas: (i) Competition, Market Structure 
and Productivity Growth; (ii) (Economic) Institutions, Industrial Policy and Productivity Growth; and 
(iii) Service Sectors and Productivity Growth. 
 
The links between state-business relations and industrial policy are central to the second of these areas: 
Institutions, Industrial Policy and Productivity Growth. This paper summarises the contributions to two 
parallel sessions on state-business relations at the UN-WIDER conference. The aim is to make DEGRP 
and other research accessible for wider audiences.   
 
This note includes a number of contributions by experts on state-business relations spanning policy and 
research communities: 
 




 State-business relations and industrial policy: an introduction – by Dirk Willem te Velde of the 
Overseas Development Institute (Research Leader for the DEGRP Evidence and Policy Group) 
 State-business relations and economic development – by Kunal Sen of Manchester University 
 Industrial policy and state-business relations: towards a heuristic approach – by Lars Buur (DIIS) 
and Lindsay Whitfield (Roskilde University) 
 State-business relations: structural change and industrialisation in Africa – by Margaret McMillan 
(IFPRI, Tufts University) and Dani Rodrik (Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social 
Science, Princeton) 
 Industrial Policy in Practice: Africa’s Presidential Investors’ Advisory Councils – by John Page of 
the Brookings Institution 
 Attempt to develop a global indicator on private-sector involvement in public policies and 
strategies - by Benjamin Herzberg and Lili Sisombat of the World Bank. 
 
These essays summarise current research and policy debates in the area of state-business relations and 
industrial policy. The essays provide up-to-date insights into the economics of state-business relations 
(te Velde, Sen) and the politics and appropriate institutional settings for state-business relations (Buur 
and Whitfield, McMillan and Rodrik). They also include examples of the impact of state-business 
relations, e.g. with respect to Africa’s Presidential Investors’ Advisory Councils (Page), and how state-
business relations might relate to economic development (Sen) or structural change (McMillan and 
Rodrik). The essays suggest a number of avenues for further policy research, e.g. constructing a global 
index on state-business relations (Herzberg and Sisombat) or future policy-relevant research on the 
importance of the practice of state-business relations or detailed institutional studies of state-business 
relations (te Velde). 
 
What do the essays tell us? 
 
 Policy matters. While manufacturing productivity is converging internationally (regardless of 
policies and institutions), because manufacturing is a very small part of many LICs, and because 
resources do not flow into manufacturing sufficiently rapidly, there is still low aggregate 
productivity growth in LICs. Therefore, there is a role for industrial policy in increasing 
productivity. 
 
 Institutions matter. Research and policy communities appreciate the crucial role played by an 
appropriate institutional setting for effective industrial policy.  
 
 The principles behind effective state-business relations are largely known. The understanding of 
what makes appropriate institutional settings behind industrial policy is advancing, especially 
with respect to effective state-business relations. Different researchers use different terms to 
describe a range of institutional factors (in relation to state-business relations) crucial for effective 
industrial policy: 
 




- Mechanisms that enable transparency, ensure the likelihood of reciprocity, increase 
credibility of the state among capitalists and establish high levels of trust between public and 
private agents (te Velde); 
- Mutual interests, pockets of efficiency and learning for productivity (Buur and Whitfield); 
- Embeddedness, discipline and accountability (McMillan and Rodrik); and 
- Commitment, focus, experimentation and feedback (Page). 
 
 In this context, it is interesting to note that recent discussions also point to the importance of 
accountability of state-business relations to civil society or the public at large.  
 
 High-quality evidence using long-runs of data is lacking. So far, we have only scratched the 
surface of identifying and measuring the contribution of different types of state-business 
relations (te Velde, Sen) and more needs to be done as this can help in understanding more 
precisely the factors behind improved industrial policy-making. For example, we do not even 








2. State-business relations 
and industrial policy: an 
introduction 
Dirk Willem te Velde, Overseas Development Institute 
1. Introduction 
There has traditionally been much debate about the role of industrial policy in development (e.g. Pack 
and Saggi, 2006). The key questions concern whether and how low-income countries (LICs) can 
industrialise, what effective industrial policies (as opposed to other factors) are conducive to industrial 
development, and what factors lie behind such effective industrial policies. This paper examines the link 
between state-business relations and effective industrial policies, reviewing what we know and what we 
need to know, building on previous review essays that examined related areas (te Velde, 2010 and 
Peiffer, 2012). 
 
The policy context in which this research takes place has been changing rapidly in recent years. Less 
than a decade ago, major policy documents such the World Bank’s World Development Report 2005 on 
the investment climate mentioned ‘industrial’ only in the appendix. Now IMF and the World Bank both 
acknowledge that targeted intervention can help economies transform structurally (IMF, 2012) with 
headings such as ‘Market failures that can justify innovation and industrial policies’ (World Bank, 2012a) 
and ‘The case for targeted management training’ (World Bank, 2012b). The growth policy pendulum is 
swinging.  
 
Recognising that (nearly) all countries are using industrial policies, the next key policy question is: What 
types of institutional contexts (Rodrik, 2004) are conducive to effective industrial policies (i.e. those that 
achieve stated objectives, for example, industrialisation)? Institutions and the rules of the game (North, 
1990) normally evolve slowly. They can involve either tightly controlled or loose relationships between 
state and business, and can be formal or more informal. Sometimes, institutions change rapidly if some 
critical juncture has been passed, such as a big internal or external shock. 
 
This essay suggests that a lot of progress has been made in the study of institutional contexts behind 
industrial policy, in particular on state-business relations. Progress has been made by political scientists 
in studies that examine political incentives for growth (Booth and te Velde, 2009, Leftwich, 2009); studies 




that examine the economics and measurable aspects of state-business relations (te Velde, 2006, Sen, 
2013); and careful case studies of formal and informal state-business relations (Schmitz and Abdel-Latif, 
2009). While these studies have progressed the boundaries of our knowledge, they have also hit 
methodological challenges. We will introduce the main issues and then think ahead. 
 
The structure of the note is as follows: It will first introduce some definitions and then ask what we 
know about the role of industrial policy in development (section 3), the role of state-business relations 
for industrial policy (section 4), the characteristics of good state-business relations (section 5), 
methodologies used (section 6) and possible ways forward (section 7). 
 
2. What is industrial policy and what are state-business relations? 
Industrial policies are those that, by design, target the (dynamic) development of a sector or sub-set of 
activities in the whole economy. They are not limited to policies affecting industry but could also include 
policies aimed at services or agricultural development. Pack and Saggi (2006) argue industrial policies 
are any type of selective intervention or government policy that attempt to alter the structure of 
production toward sectors that are expected to offer better prospects for economic growth than would 
occur in the absence of such intervention. 
 
State-business relations are relations between the public and private sectors. The forms vary 
significantly, ranging from formal, regular co-ordination arrangements to informal, ad hoc interactions. 
They can cover the whole economy or target specific sectors, types of firms or policy processes. In some 
situations they involve highly organised relationships, in others they are loose relationships between the 
state and business.  
 
In practice, it can be complicated further by the fact that ownership of the business sector lies with the 
state, and vice versa, that business leaders are politicians: sometimes we do not know. At some point, 
the state controlled 50% of the Malawian economy and it became difficult to differentiate the public from 
the private sector. As one USAID official observed: ‘Malawi’s private sector is alive, doing well and 
owned by the government’ (cited in Leftwich, Sen and te Velde, 2008). 
 
3. What do we know about the role of industrial policy in development? 
There has been a long-standing debate on the role of the public and private sector in driving growth and 
productivity change, which is highly relevant to research projects in the DFID-ESRC Growth Research 
Programme (DEGRP). Lin (2012) reviews the debate in his book on structural economics. On one leg of 
the pendulum are the old structuralists of the 1950s who argued that import substitution and heavy 
manufacturing was the way to grow. The failures of these policies and the resulting debt crisis led to the 
adoption of the Washington consensus in the 1990s, when international competition and deregulation 
ruled. The 2005 World Development Report still did not mention industrial policy, but by then a new 
strand of growth diagnostic studies had begun to take hold which focused on the most binding 




constraints to growth. This involves, by definition, targeted solutions to specific constraints. Further, the 
2008 Growth Commission report examined a range of successful growth cases and highlighted 
leadership as an important ingredient. A special issue of the Development Policy Review (Lin et al., 
2011) featured a discussion on the role of the state in growth identification and facilitation; the lead 
article suggested a six-point plan involving a strong role for the state, such as building special economic 
zones or industrial parks to overcome barriers to firm entry and foreign direct investment (FDI), and 
encouraging the formation of industrial clusters. Commentators such as K. Y. Amoako suggested an 
even stronger role of the state. The growth policy pendulum had swung back. 
 
Industrial policy can be important in theory. Industrial policy can help address market and co-
ordination failures (te Velde and Morrissey, 2005). The process of innovation involves learning, 
institutional development and systematic interactions between various actors (Nelson, 1993) and is beset 
by a range of market, co-ordination (Rodenstein-Road, 1943) and government failures. Market and 
coordination failures are prevalent in areas such as skills development, technological development and 
knowledge externalities (Pack and Westphal, 1986, Lall, 2001), infrastructure provision, and capital 
markets (Stiglitz, 1996). Co-ordination failures also operate between linked firms, in clusters of firms and 
relating to the economy as a whole, and might prevent an economy from reaching a higher development 
path (Rodrik, 1996). The debate has never been about whether such market failures existed, but to what 
extent they do; we have never been good at measuring the degree of market failure. The Stern report 
(2006) called climate change the greatest market failure ever: how do we know the size of the market 
failure in industrial development? 
 
Beyond theory, we also know that industrial policy can work in practice to help develop some countries 
structurally, although it fails in other countries. Industrial policy has worked in countries such as 
Singapore, Ireland, Taiwan, Malaysia and Mauritius who managed to direct the market into sectors 
using clustering and targeted technology and human resource development (te Velde, 2003). There are 
doubts in other cases, e.g. in Eastern Europe before the fall of the wall (Stiglitz, 1996), Latin American 
countries during the import substitution period, or failed experiments in Tanzania where public 
technology institutes were delinked from private sector users (Lall, 2001).  
  
There have also been attempts to identify principles behind effective policy. Rodrik (2004) lists a number 
of design principles for effective industrial policy:  
 Incentives should be provided only to ‘new’ activities 
 There should be clear benchmarks/criteria for success and failure 
 There must be a built-in sunset clause 
 Public support must target activities, not sectors 
 Activities that are subsidised must have the clear potential of providing spill-overs and 
demonstration effects 
 The authority for carrying out industrial policies must be vested in agencies with demonstrated 
competence 
 Implementing agencies must be monitored closely by a principal with a clear stake in the 
outcomes and who has political authority at the highest level 




 The agencies carrying out promotion must maintain channels of communication with the private 
sector 
 Optimally, mistakes that result in ‘picking the losers’ will occur 
 Promotion activities need to have the capacity to renew themselves so that the cycle of discovery 
becomes an on-going one. 
 
The World Bank (2012) suggests that lessons from past successes and failures of standard industrial 
policies are clear: governments should subject firms to competition, have clear sunset clauses and focus 
on well-identified market failures (Baldwin, 1969, Pack and Saggi, 2006), spill-over or latent comparative 
advantages.  
 
So a lot is known and a more pragmatic view is emerging: industrial policy is important in theory and 
practice and it is possible to identify a set of design principles behind effective industrial policy. 
Increasingly, there is recognition that most countries practice industrial policy to some extent, and with 
the growth policy pendulum swinging once more we should examine what makes good industrial 
policy that helps to promote growth and productivity change. This paper examines the role of state-
business relations in this. 
 
4.  What is the role of state-business relations in industrial policy? 
It is not too difficult to see state-business relations operating in practice, e.g. when discussing investment 
incentives, taxes or red tape. Less is known about the economic functions of state-business relations. 
Doner and Schneider (2000) discuss a number of market-complementing functions of business 
associations as key agents in the conduct of organised state-business relations: macroeconomic 
stabilisation, horizontal and vertical coordination, lowering costs of information, standard setting and 
quality upgrading. 
 
The role of agencies and their effective interactions complement price mechanisms in allocating 
resources and promoting industrial development. State-business relations have a role because: (i) there 
are market failures (the market alone cannot achieve an optimal allocation of resources); and (ii) there 
are government failures (state actors may not be able to address market failures on their own). As 
discussed in te Velde (2010) effective state-business relations can address market and coordination 
failures and government failures, and can reduce policy uncertainty. 
 
Business associations and government departments may help coordinate dispersed information among 
stakeholders. They can lobby the government to provide more appropriate and good quality education 
and infrastructure, which is unlikely to be supplied through a fragmented private sector which relies on 
a price mechanism based on incomplete markets. Econometric work based on a large survey of firms in a 
number of Sub-Saharan African countries (Qureshi and te Velde, 2007) suggests that firms derive growth 
benefits from being a member of a business association, consistent with their stated preferences that 
business associations lobby on their behalf (in addition to direct lobbying) and provide relevant 
information. 





Effective state-business relations address failures in government policy designed to overcome market 
failures. Governments can fail as they are unlikely to have perfect information and perfect foresight; 
suffer from moral hazard problems (Hausman and Rodrik, 2002); or are captured by elites. Effective 
state-business relations (e.g. a democratic way of conducting state-business relations underpinned by the 
principles enshrined in an effective competition policy) provide a check and balance function on 
government policies and their tax and expenditure plans—Bwalya et al., 2009 suggest how the private 
sector in Zambia can be successful in its budget proposals. Effective state-business relations may 
improve the relevance of government spending. The design of effective government policies and 
regulations depends on, among other things, inputs from and consultation with the private sector. 
Regular sharing of information between the state and businesses ensures that private sector objectives 
are met with public actions and that local-level issues are fed into higher-level policy processes. The 
private sector can identify constraints, opportunities and possible policy options for creating incentives, 
lowering investment risks and reducing the cost of doing business. This can facilitate appropriate and 
active market-friendly interventions. More efficient institutions, rules and regulations might be achieved 
through policy advocacy, which could reduce the costs and risks faced by firms, and enhance 
productivity.  
 
Effective state-business relations and membership of business associations may help reduce policy 
uncertainty. Firms operate in an uncertain environment and frequently face risks and resource 
shortages. They undertake decisions concerning technology, inputs and production facilities based on 
anticipated market conditions and profitability. Uncertainty can have significant negative effects on 
investment, and hence wealth creation, when investment involves large sunk and irreversible costs and 
there is the option to delay the decision to make the investment until further information becomes 
available (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Policy uncertainty is an important source of uncertainty. Businesses 
that have a good relationship with the government may be able to anticipate policy decisions. Evidence 
from around 1,000 firms in a number of Sub-Saharan African countries (Qureshi and te Velde, 2012) 
finds that firms which are a member of a business association pay a lower percentage of revenue as 
informal payments to government officials, face lower costs of insufficient water supply and make more 
use of information and communication technology facilities. This suggests that organised state-business 
relations play an important role in the creation of good institutions and governance, and the 
establishment of a better investment climate. 
 
5.  What are the characteristics of effective state-business relations for good 
industrial policy? 
A number of studies have suggested possible effective state-business relations for good industrial policy. 
Studies often emphasise consistency (education policies in Ireland) and leadership (Singapore) in 
policies. The World Bank (2012) argues that industrial policies need strong institutions, as they are 
vulnerable to capture and rent-seeking and to inefficient micromanagement of the innovation and 
investment process. Rodrik (2004) argues that the right model for industrial policy is not that of an 
autonomous government applying Pigovian taxes or subsidies, but of strategic collaboration between 
the private sector and the government, with the aim of uncovering where the most significant obstacles 
to restructuring lie, and what type of interventions are most likely to remove them. He lists three key 




elements for appropriate institutional architecture: (i) political leadership at the top; (ii) co-ordination 
and deliberation councils; and (iii) mechanisms of transparency and accountability. He suggests focusing 
on the process of industrial policy is more important than policy outcomes. 
 
Rodrik’s work appears to have been inspired by the work of Evans (1995) of an ‘embedded autonomy’ in 
which the public and private sectors form a strategic relationship. Examining the contributions by Evans 
(1995) and Maxfield and Schneider (1997), good state-business relations tend to be based on benign 
collaboration between business and the state, with positive mechanisms that enable transparency, ensure 
the likelihood of reciprocity, increase credibility of the state among capitalists and establish high levels 
of trust between public and private agents.  
 
te Velde (2006) identifies a set of key measurable factors behind them. For example, to obtain credibility 
and reciprocity, both public and private sectors need to be organised or institutionalised. Positive 
mechanisms for transparency require that some rules or institutions bring the state and business 
together, and a set of principles is needed to restrain collusive behaviour. He suggests four factors make 
for effective state-business relations, which can clearly be expanded and improved on in specific 
research contexts: (i) the way the private sector is organised vis-à-vis the public sector; (ii) the way the 
public sector is organised vis-à-vis the private sector; (iii) the practice and institutionalisation of state-
business relations; and (iv) the avoidance of harmful collusive behaviour. While informal aspects may 
also influence the links between measurable aspects of state-business relations and performance, it is not 
clear how this would affect the link between formal state-business relations and growth. 
 
Some authors argue that informal state-business relations are more important for growth and structural 
change. Often, formal relationships are effective because informal ties exist underneath. Abdel-Latif and 
Schmitz (2010) stress the importance of informal ties and the inter-connection between formal and 
informal ties – and their relevance for growth – in Egypt. Peiffer (2012) suggests that providing a formal 
setting for state and business actors to meet will not necessarily result in a reform coalition. Instead, 
informal coalitions could facilitate appropriate policy, as in the food sector in Egypt (Abdel-Latif and 
Schmitz, 2010). Another example includes Seekings and Nattrass (2011) who find that not all formalised 
state-business relations structures work effectively, e.g. NEDLAC in South Africa. 
 
A different strand of thought has focused on the role of different types of interactions among 
stakeholders as part of national innovation systems (NIS). NIS are networks of institutions in the public 
and private sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new 
technologies (Freeman, 1995). Non-market institutions play a vital role in building technological 
capabilities, in addition to addressing market failures, as discussed in the evolutionary approach to 
industrial development (Lall and Pietrobelli, 2001). 
 
In conclusion, there is a set of important state-business relations characteristics, including consistency, 
leadership, transparency, competition and collaboration in networks. 




6. What methodologies have been used to examine state-business relations? 
Recent years have seen different types of studies on state-business relations using various 
methodologies (see Sen, 2013). Some case studies have used historical institutionalist approaches which 
use detailed historical and analytical work (Leftwich, 2009, Seekings and Nattrass, 2011) to trace the 
evolution of state-business relations. Other studies used economic approaches involving measuring of 
state-business relations and examining their impact on economic performance, at both micro and macro 
levels.  
 
These studies tend to find that agencies and their effective interactions complement the price mechanism 
in allocating resources and, in positive cases, promoting growth. They also suggest that formalised state-
business relations can promote economic performance, e.g. through more efficient allocation of 
government spending and better growth and industrial policies (e.g. Mauritius and Zambia through 
affecting budgets). In Zambia, business associations are both perceived to be effective and have actually 
been shown to be effective through providing information and lobbying government (Qureshi and te 
Velde, 2013). Yet, state-business relations need to be disciplined by a set of competition principles, or 
risk becoming collusive rather than collaborative. Not all formal state-business relations work well (e.g. 
South Africa, where formal state-business relations were avoided), and informal state-business relations 
(e.g. Egypt) or individual networks (Ghana) can play a key role. Harmful collusive relationships can be 
turned into more collaborative relationships (India), e.g. when leaders and elites work to form positive 
growth or developmental coalitions.  
 
But studies also suggest that there are challenges with the methodologies. Economic studies are based on 
measures which describe only certain aspects but perhaps not the ones that matter, or those that are hard 
to measure. The detailed case studies may find it hard to uncover cause and effect (e.g. Peiffer, 2012), 
construct counterfactuals, describe the essence of state-business relations or abstract from policy 
suggestions.  
 
7. Future research directions on state-business relations and industrial policy 
There have been rapid changes in the policy environment: now accepting a role for industrial policy, the 
emphasis has shifted to examining the appropriate institutional settings within which industrial policy is 
designed and implemented. There are a number of gaps in our understanding.  
 
1. There is a lack of systematic analysis on the characteristics of effective state-business relations 
across case studies in LICs. We have not yet brought together all the rich experiences in case 
studies and analysed them in a consistent way. As a first step, there seems to be mileage in 
building up a set of empirical studies across locations on successful economic functions of state-
business relations. This could explain the importance of trust building, transparency, leadership 
etc., in the conduct of state-business relations. 
 




2. Some studies have used measures of state-business relations which could be improved on the 
basis of better case studies. As a first step, it might be useful to examine a few selective 
indicators which can be measured objectively (e.g. how often do the sides meet, are there 
informed positions, does membership pay fees for a business organisation, involvement of 
external actors, characteristics of leaders involved, etc.). These data could be examined for 
commonalities across states, countries, etc. 
 
3. While studies have examined the effect of state-business relations, none of them have 
examined the effects of such institutions on big shifts or structural transformation. Do state-
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3. State-business relations 
and economic 
development 
Kunal Sen, IDPM, University of Manchester, UK   
 
The nature of the relationship between the state and business lies at the heart of the big debates on 
economic development. While there is much literature on how effective state-business relations have 
evolved in East Asia and Latin America and how they mattered for economic development in these 
regions (Johnson, 1987, Maxfield and Schneider, 1997), we know surprisingly little about the nature of 
state-business relations, how effective they were, how they evolved, and whether they mattered for 
economic performance in the two regions of the world which matter most from the viewpoint of 
economic development – Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. A recent volume edited by myself (Sen, K., 
2013, State-Business Relations and Economic Development in Africa and India, Routledge, UK) based on 
original empirical research undertaken in Africa and India attempts to address this important gap in the 
literature. The volume (Sen, 2013) addresses three core research questions that have had little previous 
study in literature. First, what characterises effective state-business relations and how have they evolved 
over time across Africa and India? Second, what are the implications of effective state-business relations 
for economic performance in Africa and India? In particular, how do effective state-business relations 
affect economic performance at the micro, meso and macro levels? Finally, how do effective state-
business relations emerge? What political factors explain their provenance, and why do collusive state-
business relations that are not growth enhancing persist over time? 
 
Each of the contributions in Sen (2013) addresses one or more of these core research questions, 
combining quantitative and qualitative methods wherever appropriate, and using interdisciplinary 
perspectives drawn from economics and political science in the analysis of state-business relations. 
Three features of the empirical analysis presented in Sen (2013) deserve special mention: first, the 
approach to measurement of state-business relations in Africa and India is the same across both contexts, 
and provides a way of measuring effective state-business relations that is innovative in its use of 
secondary data, and can be applied to other contexts and regions. The study of state-business relations in 
Africa poses a fertile ground for empirical research for both economists and political scientists. As Sen 
and te Velde (2012) argue, ‘the context for state-business relations research in Africa is rich, diverse and 
dynamic. Some countries have long had official relations separating the state and business, while in 
other countries the relations are difficult, complex and based on mistrust. In many countries, a 
significant portion of business is owned by the state. In some countries, such as Mauritius and South 




Africa, there is an institutionalised form of state-business relations, while in other countries, such as 
Malawi, the state and business were brought together through a facilitated forum. Some countries have a 
developed entrepreneurial business sector; in others this is largely absent’ (Sen and te Velde, 2012). 
 
The second feature of the analysis presented in Sen (2013) is the common approach that authors use to 
examine the effects of state-business relations on economic performance, and that the relationship 
between effective state-business relations and economic performance is examined at the micro and 
macro levels. At the macro level, this involves the use of panel regressions or time-series methods to test 
for the effect of state-business relations on economic growth. Sen and te Velde in Sen (2013) show that 
effective state-business relationships contributed significantly to economic growth in a panel of 19 Sub-
Saharan African countries over the period 1970-2004; countries which have shown improvements in 
state-business relationships have witnessed higher economic growth and control over other 
determinants of economic growth, independent of other measures of institutional quality.  
 
The contributors in Sen (2013) assess the impact of state-business relations on productivity growth at the 
firm (micro) levels using state-of-the-art econometric methods to address endogeneity in productivity 
estimates. For example, Qureshi and te Velde examine whether an effective state-business relationship 
facilitated by an organised private sector improves firm performance in Zambia. Exploiting the 
enterprise survey data of the World Bank Group, they find that being a member of a business association 
improves firm performance in Zambia in the form of productivity. They also find that joining a business 
association is particularly useful for small and medium-sized firms.  
 
The third feature of Sen (2013) is the use of a common approach – the ‘historical institutionalist’ 
approach – among the contributors in explaining the emergence of effective state-business relations in 
some contexts and not in others. The ‘historical institutionalist’ approach involves the use of detailed 
and painstaking historical and analytical work, involving ‘thick description’ (Leftwich, 2009), and the 
contributors use this approach to trace the evolution of state-business relations in Sub-Saharan Africa 
and states in India. The contributors identify specific ‘critical junctures’ which are ‘moments when 
institutional innovation or change may be initiated or, at least, which create the opportunity for it to 
occur’ (Leftwich, 2009, p. 9) in the evolution of state-business relations. These ‘critical junctures’ may 
explain why there may have been a change from collusive to synergistic state-business relations (or a 
return to collusive state-business relations from collaborative state-business relations) in a given 
historical context. However, the contributions also highlight the importance of path dependence, that is, 
when ‘an institutional choice/decision has been made or formed and sustained/consolidated over time, it 
sets the pattern and gets ‘locked in’ (Leftwich, 2009, p. 8). This may explain why particular collusive 
state-business relations which are clearly growth impeding may persist over time, if such relations 
benefit a narrow powerful economic and political elite who gain from the rents accruing from such a 
relationship. For example, in Sen (2013), Chingaipe, in his analysis of the institutional and organisational 
evolution of state-business relations in colonial Malawi, illuminates how state-business relations were 
central to the politics of state formation and the evolution, form and character of state-society relations, 
and demonstrates that the distribution and exercise of power between state and business elites, and the 
relative financial and political importance of the business sector to the state shaped the institutional and 
organisational forms, as well as the content of state-business relations.  





The main conclusion of Sen (2013) is that where effective state-business relations are established – either 
through formal or informal institutional patterns and relationships – the growth effects are generally 
positive. But forming such institutions of cooperation and credibility cannot be made to order and is not 
a simple matter of administration or pragmatism. Establishing, sustaining and renewing effective state-
business relations are political processes, and the better organised the business community and the 
government are for purposes of such relations, the more effective state-business relations will be in 
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4. Industrial policy and 
state-business relations: 
towards a heuristic 
approach 
Lars Buur, Danish Institute for International Studies and 
Lindsay Whitfield, Roskilde University   
 
Industrial policy requires changing the distribution of economic benefits and prioritising among 
economic sectors, which experience shows is always contested. The greater the contest among political 
elites over redistribution and prioritisation, the harder it is for ruling elites to look beyond their 
immediate political survival and strategies. Short-term political survival imperatives constrain the ability 
of ruling elites (or a faction of them) to prioritise and pursue industrial policies, whose results are 
uncertain and can take a long time to deliver (Whitfield and Therkildsen, 2011). The result is that 
support for industrial policies is often piece-meal and fragmented. 
 
The fact that industrial policy is always contested does not mean that no forms of industrial policy will 
work (Amsden, 2001). We argue that successful industrial policy requires the simultaneous occurrence 
of three conditions related to state-business relations: mutual interests, pockets of efficiency and learning 
for productivity. These relationships are illustrated in Figure 1, a three-dimensional heuristic device to 
explain the conditions under which successful industrial policy is likely to occur. For that purpose, the 
roles of capitalist, ruling elite and state bureaucrats are depicted as distinct. However, in reality the lines 
between the positions in the figure can be blurred, and they are usually in tension. When the tensions 
are overcome, there is a ‘fit’.  
 
  




Figure 1 Politics of Industrial Policy 
 
One caveat is that it is very difficult to make predictions based on our model. The Elites, Production and 
Poverty Programme has so far found that the factors motivating ruling elites and shaping 
implementation can differ across productive sectors, as contestations within ruling coalitions vary, the 
group of capitalists involved can vary by sector, sectors have different economic characteristics, and 
sectors can be embedded in different institutions and sets of political and socio-economic relations. Thus, 
state interventions to support certain sectors can be relatively successful in one sector, while 
interventions to support other sectors will be much less successful, or fail. For the same reason, we can 
observe different outcomes in the same sector across different countries during the same time period 
(Whitfield et al., forthcoming). But when the three conditions have come together, it has generally been 
when ruling elites faced severe internal and external threats in the context of limited resources—what is 
referred to as systemic vulnerability (Doner et al., 2005). Systemic vulnerability pressures, or what can 
resemble such pressures, can compel ruling elites to support processes of industrial policy and economic 
transformation in order to ameliorate opposition pressures, hereunder electoral pressures, besides mass 
unrest, and meeting external security or existential threats to the country. 
 
How do mutual interests emerge? 
For ruling elites (or a faction) to address the productivity-constraining problems in a particular 
productive sector, they must have the incentive to do so. They must have some kind of general mutual 
interest with the relevant group of capitalist firms/farms (we draw here on Moore and Schmitz, 2008). 
What capitalists need is for problems that are related to their ability to profit in the future from 
investment decisions to be settled. This is true regardless of the mix of objectives to promote investment 
from private-owned firms, state-owned firms, public-private joint ventures or party-owned firms. 
Political support is important because:  
 It can reduce uncertainty, and state support can be provided in many ways  




 Capitalists want predictability of government actions, including that the promised political 
support is credible, i.e. it will be provided (Maxfield and Schneider, 1997) 
 Predictability and credible commitment can occur even when the overall business environment is 
poor. 
 
The technological capabilities and relative holding power of domestic capitalists shape the incentives 
facing ruling elites, where capitalists will usually ask for access to rents. Rent-seeking activities by 
capitalists are not necessarily damaging if they can induce the ruling coalition to promote productive 
sectors (Khan, 2010). Whether or not they can do this depends on their power; the ability of capitalist 
firms/farms or their industry association to engage successfully in activities to protect or further their 
interests through a political process. 
 
What are pockets of efficiency? 
The group of ruling elites pushing a particular industrial policy must be able to exert enough control 
over factional demands within the ruling coalition to implement the policy—this creates the ‘pocket’ in 
which state bureaucrats can work in relative autonomy from demands within the ruling coalition. On 
the part of state bureaucrats in charge of the details of designing and implementing the industrial policy, 
these bureaucrats must be trusted by the ruling elites, but also be knowledgeable of the targeted 
industry (Maxfield and Schneider, 1997)—this creates the efficiency. When this occurs, we can say that a 
pocket of efficiency exists, which lends the impression of strong ‘state capabilities’.  
 
The less centralised control or authority over higher- and lower-level factions, the more difficult it is for 
political leaders to create pockets of efficiency. It forces them to focus on keeping coalitions cohesive by 
buying off elites or acquiescing to their individual demands. Industrial policies typically involve a 
certain amount of social conflict that comes from changes in the existing distribution of benefits or in the 
allocation of state resources, which can have detrimental effects for specific groups. The more 
fragmented the ruling coalition is, the more difficult it will be for top political leaders to resist 
distributional demands: 
 Retaining the support of the lower-level factions is critical for remaining in power 
 Strong factions within the ruling elite can resist particular policies or their implementation.  
 
State bureaucrats in charge of industrial policy must have political backing from ruling elites and a 
significant degree of autonomy from political pressures stemming from within the ruling coalition. This 
stems from competence and from being trusted by the ruling elite, and thus deemed to be loyal. As a 
result, pockets of efficiency are not permanent but have life spans that depend on the ruling elites 
remaining in power. The more frequent the turnover of ruling parties (or ruling coalitions), the shorter 
the life span of pockets of efficiency and the need to continuously recreate them. In countries with large 
pools of competent technocrats who can be employed, this is less of a problem. In contrast, in less 
developed countries, where the pool to choose from is not very big, it can be a major problem.  
 




Why is learning for productivity important? 
The last leg in the triangle is learning for productivity, which is conditioned by the relationships that 
evolve between relevant state bureaucrats and capitalists (Doner and Schneider, 2000). Where capitalists 
pursue profit above all else, often by asking for rent from political leaders, they must be conditioned 
towards increasing productivity and upgrading, in order to be beneficial for industrial policies. This 
requires that state bureaucrats: 
 Are embedded in order for them to know the productivity constraints facing individual firms 
and the industry as a whole 
 Must be able to translate needs into effective industrial policy through mediating the political 
objectives of ruling elites and the economic needs of the industry (Buur et al., 2012) 
 Must be able to enforce the new rules or conditions attached to rents for the relevant capitalists. 
 
Although overall political imperatives drive major policy decisions and orientations, state bureaucrats 
can be influential in shaping the exact implementation arrangements of industrial policy in terms of how 
policies are designed to meet the political objectives of ruling elites (including objectives driven by 
mutual interests with capitalists). This requires that capitalists are not able to use political connections 
and influence to undermine enforcement. Rents given to capitalists by ruling elites must have conditions 
for learning, as capitalists tend to pursue the easiest option and may not invest in learning to turn a 
profit. It is common that industry associations in developing countries can be weak and thus undermine 
effective interaction with state bureaucrats and ruling elites.  
 
For further information see UNU-WIDER paper by Lindsay Whitfield, Lars Buur, Ole Therkildsen and 
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5. State-business relations: 
structural change and 
industrialisation in Africa 
Margaret McMillan, IFPRI, Tufts University and  
Dani Rodrik, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social 
Science, Princeton 
  
Recent patterns of employment shares in Africa fit the stylised facts of other regions’ historical 
development (McMillan, 2013). In other words, employment shares in agriculture, industry and services 
are roughly what we would expect given African levels of income and based on what has transpired 
elsewhere. However, between 1990 and 1999, structural change was a drag on economy-wide 
productivity in Africa: overall growth in labour productivity was negative and largely a result of 
structural change. But from 2000 onward, structural change contributed around one percentage point to 
labour productivity growth in both the weighted and the un-weighted sample. Moreover, overall labour 
productivity growth in Africa was second only to Asia where structural change continued to play an 
important positive role. There is however an important difference between the two regions: the share of 
employment in manufacturing in Asia is roughly double the share of employment in manufacturing in 
Africa.  
 
The manufacturing deficit in Africa cannot be overlooked. In a recent paper named ‘Unconditional 
Convergence in Manufacturing’ (QJE, 2013), Dani Rodrik demonstrates the supreme importance of 
manufacturing as a driver of productivity growth. In this paper he shows that manufacturing, or more 
correctly, organised manufacturing, exhibits a tendency to converge on the labour productivity frontier 
unconditionally, that is, even in the absence of supportive policies and institutions. Surprising as it is, he 
points out that this result holds equally well for the 20 or so Sub-Saharan African countries that are in his 
overall sample.   
 
The reason convergence in manufacturing does not aggregate up to convergence for the economy as a 
whole is that: (a) manufacturing is a very small part of the economy, especially in African countries; and 
(b) resources do not flow into manufacturing sufficiently rapidly, or at all. These results highlight the 
significance of the manufacturing deficit in Africa, and the importance of policy frameworks that can 
address it.   





According to Rodrik, industrial policies, along with competitive exchange rates, can play a role in 
expanding manufacturing. But these policies have demanding prerequisites. At a recent gathering of 
academics and policy-makers, Rodrik discussed these prerequisites in the context of a simple 
institutional framework, emphasising three key ideas: embeddedness, discipline and accountability. 
 
Embeddedness refers to the idea that policy-makers must be sufficiently close to the real economy that 
they are in a position to elicit information about opportunities and obstacles that businesses encounter as 
they try to grow or enter new activities. Embeddedness requires a range of institutions – from 
deliberation councils up top to informal exchanges below – that ensure the two-way flow of information 
and prepare the groundwork for strategic collaboration between the government and business in the 
productive sphere.  
 
But embeddedness does not mean ‘in bed with’ and that is where discipline comes in. Policy-makers 
need to ensure that business lives up to its side of the bargain and does not toy with the government. 
This in turn requires a range of safeguards, such as explicit targets and objectives, monitoring and 
evaluation, and support phase-outs. 
 
The relationship between business and policy officials needs to be accountable to society at large. This 
can be achieved by ensuring transparency in the relationship and by making sure there is a clear political 
champion who oversees the process and is accountable for its potential failings.   
 
In closing, Rodrik discussed the political conditions that enable the establishment of such institutions. 
The literature stresses the importance of an appropriate configuration of political power and vested 
interests in favour of developmental policies. It talks about political settlements or social contracts that 
set the stage for East Asian style industrial policies. Without denigrating the importance of political 
power, Rodrik argued that ideas about what could be achieved, and how, are also quite important. 
Political leaders can forge the requisite coalitions by articulating an appropriate narrative about 
productive diversification and its importance in achieving the ends that powerful groups desire. Ideas 
can help shape (perceived) interests.  
 
Several recent trends in the global economy provide Africa with unprecedented opportunities that could 
make these ideas easier to sell. Increasing agricultural productivity in Africa and rising global food and 
commodity prices, coupled with stable macro and political trends, have made foreign and local 
entrepreneurs more willing to invest in agribusiness in Africa (Radelet, 2010). Rising wages in China 
make Africa a more attractive destination for labour-intensive manufacturing, and the global search for 
natural resources leaves African governments with unprecedented bargaining power and financial 
resources.   
 




At least a few African countries are taking advantage of these trends and could end up serving as role 
models. For example, the government of Ethiopia is working closely with entrepreneurs in the leather 
and shoe industries to foster industrial upgrading and employment growth in that sector (Brautigam, 
McMillan and Zhang, 2013). There is also some evidence indicating that the spread of democracy in 
Africa makes it more likely that Africa’s citizens will hold both business and policy-makers accountable 
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Recent writing on industrial policy has emphasised the need to ‘embed’ it in a process of consultation 
and coordination with the private sector, both to assist in the design of appropriate public actions and to 
provide feedback on the implementation of policy. In 2001, both the IMF and the World Bank urged 
African governments to establish Presidential Investors’ Advisory Councils (PIACs), a forum for private-
public dialogue. The councils were expected to enable African presidents to hear the views of 
experienced and successful business leaders and to ‘identify constraints to foreign and domestic 
investment, generate recommendations for concrete action, and reinforce and accelerate policy reforms’. 
In short, they were public-private coordination mechanisms. 
 
PIACs were launched in Ghana, Tanzania and Senegal in 2002 and in Mali and Uganda in 2004. 
Subsequently, councils were set up in Mauritania, and Benin1. Over slightly more than a decade, the 
councils have evolved in different ways, both in terms of their mandate and structure and in terms of 
their impact. Ghana’s council disappeared, while Ethiopia, which had a history of deep distrust between 
business and government, felt the need to introduce a council in 2010. Uganda’s council has been judged 
by external evaluators to have been the most successful; a judgment validated by the generally high 
marks given to the council by private investors in the country. The councils in Senegal and Tanzania 
have had some impact, but fall between Ghana at one extreme and Uganda at the other in terms of their 
performance. 
 
                                                     
 
1 The names of the PIACs have adapted to local circumstances. In the text that follows the term ‘councils’ will be used generically to describe the 
investors’ advisory group that is chaired by the head of state or head of government.  




This paper draws on case studies of PIACs in four countries (Page, 2013) –Ethiopia, Senegal, Tanzania 
and Uganda– undertaken in 2012 by the African Development Bank (AfDB) to answer the question: To 
what extent have the councils succeeded as business-government coordination mechanisms?. The 
evaluation is based on the performance of the councils in four thematic areas –commitment, focus, 
experimentation and feedback– which were associated with successful business-government 
coordination in East Asia  
 
Commitment: While the senior political leadership in each country has remained as the chair of the 
council, the amount of high-level commitment varies quite substantially. Uganda is the only country in 
which the president has found time to hold more than one council meeting per year and in which he has 
a reputation for following up on council deliberations. Ghana and Ethiopia represent the other extreme. 
In Ghana, the President quickly lost interest and the council lost momentum. In Ethiopia, the prime 
minister, who had a track record of close engagement with private investors at the sector and industry 
level, failed to call for a national meeting of the newly created council. 
 
Focus: In general, the councils have been better at focusing attention and provoking action on a donor-
driven agenda of previously identified reforms than they have been at setting their own agenda. 
Ethiopia is the only country in which the council has not used the World Bank regulatory reform menu 
as a basis for action. Especially in Senegal and Tanzania, the agenda has been aligned to the nine Doing 
Business indicators, and impact has been judged by movements in the countries’ relative ranking. Before 
it collapsed, the reform agenda of the council in Ghana was similarly structured.  
 
Outside of regulatory reform, councils have taken a broad-based approach, rather than focusing on a 
limited number of specific constraints to firm performance and attempting to resolve them. In Senegal, 
Tanzania and Uganda, they have been used as sounding boards to test the reaction of the private sector 
to national development initiatives. This has led to multiple recommendations for action – often 
unsupported by analysis – that, for the most part, have not been taken up.  
 
Experimentation: None of the councils has established a track record of experimentation. This lack of 
innovation derives from two sources. The first is the agenda-setting role of the World Bank and the 
broader donor community. From the perspective of donors, the councils are often seen as an 
implementation mechanism for their own policy reform agenda. The second limit to experimentation 
comes from the restricted membership of the councils. While council membership has shifted to include 
more domestic investors, there is a still a distinctly large-scale bias. With the possible exception of 
Uganda, the Working Groups do not appear to have made sufficient efforts to include members with the 
knowledge and interest to suggest innovative solutions to problems. 
 
Feedback: One of the key reasons to develop coordination mechanisms is to provide feedback on the 
impact of prior public actions. Where these do not have their intended outcomes, mid-course corrections 
can be made or bad policies can be abandoned. The African councils have failed to put in place adequate 
feedback mechanisms. In the first instance, the secretariats have often lacked the capacity to follow up 




recommendations of the councils. This has led to delays in implementation or simply lack of action. The 
monitoring and evaluation capacity of the secretariats is similarly poor. No council has made a 
systematic effort to monitor and evaluate the impact of decisions taken. 
 
It is doubtful that the IMF and the World Bank saw the councils as coordination mechanisms, but once 
their operational staff linked the councils to the private sector development operations of the bank and 
to the policy agenda of the government through the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), they 
became, at least in principle, policy-setting institutions. Whether intended or not, the councils became an 
experiment in using Asian-style public-private coordination in Africa. They have neither been wholly 
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7. An attempt to develop a 
global indicator on private-
sector involvement in 
public policies & strategies 
Benjamin Herzberg and Lili Sisombat, World Bank Institute, 
Private Sector Engagement for Good Governance 
(PSGG) Program 
Abstract 
This note outlines a proposal currently discussed in the Secretariat of the Global Partnership on Aid 
Effectiveness for the elaboration of an indicator to assess private-sector engagement for the purpose of 
monitoring the implementation of Busan commitments in this area at the international level. It will draw 
on the existing methodology developed in the context of the public-private dialogue, which is based on 
12 good practice principles2 to design it, operate it and exit it. These can be measured and acted upon at 
the start (baseline), during and at the end at the process (measurement of process effectiveness). The 
proposal has been elaborated by the World Bank Institute’s Private Sector Engagement for Good 
Governance, in collaboration with the OECD/UNDP joint support team and the Building Block on 
Public-Private Cooperation. 
 
Background - Fourth High-level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-4) 
At the Fourth High-level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-4) in Busan, Republic of Korea (29 November 
– 1 December 2011),  a joint statement on ‘Expanding and Enhancing Public-Private Partnership for 
Broad-based, Inclusive and Sustainable Growth’ was endorsed by governments and more than 40 
representatives from both the public and the private sector. The outcome statement, entitled ‘the Busan 
Partnership Agreement’ recognises that the for-profit private sector is a central driver of development 
and defines five principles for guiding future collective actions of the Private Sector Building Block. 
                                                     
 
2 ‘Charter of good practice in using public-private dialogue for private sector development’ adopted by DFID, OECD, World Bank and IFC at 
the international workshop on Public-Private Dialogue, Paris, February 2006. 





On the basis of the shared principles, representatives from the public and private sectors will engage in a 
new process for cooperation between governments and private sector entitled, the Private Sector 
Building Block. It aims to develop concrete initiatives for improving understanding of the role of the 
private sector in development and sharing lessons learned, in order to propose specific actions for 
greater development effectiveness.  
 
The Busan Joint Statement3 on Expanding and Enhancing Public-private Co-operation for Broad-based, 
Inclusive and Sustainable Development emphasises the importance of inclusive dialogue for building a 
policy environment. This commitment is encapsulated in paragraphs 32a and 32b of the statement, the 
implementation of which will be monitored by a global indicator to measure progress on the 
engagement and contribution of the private sector to development. 
 
The Post-Busan Interim Group (PBIG), an interim group of senior representatives mandated to lead a 
broad consultative process with a view to operationalise the statement and prepare for the establishment 
of a Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, agreed that the most important aspect 
of paragraph 32 that should be captured by the indicator is whether there is progress in private-sector 
involvement, i.e. the engagement of partner countries with representative business associations, rather 
than in the quality of the business environment itself. Measuring progress in private-sector involvement 
at the global level strengthens incentives for partner countries and donors alike to scale up and deepen 
public-private dialogue and other forms of private-sector engagement with the public sector4. Even 
though it is true that, in the end, intense public-private dialogue should lead to a better business 
environment, the PBIG assesses that no new information will come from measuring the quality of the 
business environment as there are already a number of global rankings that cover this (e.g. Doing 
Business, Competitiveness Index, etc.). The purpose of the Busan global monitoring framework focuses 
on behaviour change in development co-operation rather than development outcomes, which are 
addressed through other processes.   
 
Experience to date in elaborating an indicator on private-sector engagement 
The development of an indicator on private-sector engagement is challenging as comprehensive private-
sector engagement would need to involve a wide range of public and private sector actors (such as 
domestic and foreign companies, large companies and small and medium-sized enterprises, professional 
associations, etc.). This would require the development and implementation of a complex methodology, 
particularly business surveys which necessitate significant resources.   
 
Several initiatives have attempted to measure the degree of public-private cooperation, but all 
methodologies have proven to be difficult and frustrating. Notable work includes a measure of public-
                                                     
 
3 Please refer to the Busan outcome document: http://effectivecooperation.org/ 
4 BMZ March 2013 ‘Background note - The Global Partnership indicator on private sector involvement’. Berlin. 




private cooperation in delivering health services in Africa (Healthy Partnerships, World Bank, 2011)5, a 
series of studies in Measuring State-Business Relations (Overseas Development Institute, UK, since 
2007)6, the European Union reference model and indicators for a consultation process (2005)7 and the 
Public-Private Dialogue Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (WBG, OECD, DFID)8. 
 
Indicator to measure public-private cooperation in the context of the Busan 
Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation 
In a discussion between the UNDP/OECD Joint Support Team and interested stakeholders from the 
Building Block on Public-Private Cooperation at a workshop on measuring results of public-private 
cooperation in December 2012, participants agreed that the monitoring and evaluation framework 
provided in the Public-Private Dialogue Handbook provides a useful starting point to develop a 
proposal to assess the quality of public-private dialogue (PPD) as a proxy for public-sector engagement.   
The indicator would consist of a multi-dimensional index to assess the quality of public-private dialogue 
that would serve as a proxy for measuring public-private cooperation in selected countries, and the 
extent of private-sector engagement. It is proposed to simplify the evaluation wheel in keeping only 
critical dimensions that will assess how countries are doing in terms of involving the private sector in 
developing public policies and strategies, and provide a basic indication of the outcome/output of 
public-private dialogue. The proposed dimensions would capture: 
 
 Capacity and commitment of the public sector (capacity, political will to engage and leadership) 
 Capacity and representation of private sector (organisation, leadership, motivation, 
representation) 
 Presence of champions (existence of credible and respected individuals with the motivation and 
ability to attract the attention of stakeholders) 
 Quality of instruments (quality of programmes and mechanisms to help private-sector 
development) 
 
The indicators measuring the performance of these four dimensions can be objectively verified by 
evaluator(s) through interviews (with internal and external stakeholders), a desk study of the PPD’s 
reporting and other available written material, and observations of a PPD in action. Usually, all three 
methods will be needed to ensure proper coverage of the set of evaluation criteria. Regarding interviews, 
the first activity will be to list all relevant internal and external stakeholders and establish an order of 
priority of key persons. Good interviewing skills and techniques are required to produce good data.  
 
                                                     
 
5 https://www.wbginvestmentclimate.org/advisory-services/health/upload/Healthy-Partnerships_Full-Rpt-bkmarks-2.pdf 
6 Work led by Dirk Willem te Velde, Head of Programme, International Economic Development Group, Overseas Development Institute, UK 
(http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/4998-state-business-relations-state-business-industrial-policy). 
7 European Commission, Enterprise and Industry Directorate General 2005 ‘Consultation with Stakeholders in the Shaping of National and 
Regional Policies Affecting Small Business, Final Report of the Expert Group’. Brussels. 
8 ‘Charter of good practice in using public-private dialogue for private sector development’ adopted by DFID, OECD, World Bank and IFC at 
the International Workshop on Public-Private Dialogue, Paris, February 2006. 




Initial discussions between OECD and WBI suggest a possible approach which would be carried out 
through a step-by-step approach involving: (1) developing a comparative measurement tool, drawing on 
a simplified evaluation wheel methodology and providing a multi-dimensional measure of the quality 
of public-private dialogue (organisational effectiveness) in the form of an index; (2) piloting the tool in a 
targeted group of countries; and (3) reviewing the findings from the pilot and validating the proposed 
methodology through a broad consultative process involving the full range of stakeholders engaged in 
public-private dialogue. 
 
This approach would have the advantage of providing some initial benchmarking on the quality of 
public-private dialogue in a selected number of countries. This would provide a useful basis to inform 
the ministerial-level discussions within the Global Partnership scheduled for the end of 2013. Given the 
capacity and resources needed to support such a complex process, the desirability and feasibility of 
undertaking such an assessment on a regular basis would need to be reviewed carefully by the steering 
committee of the Global Partnership. This could include further consultations with a view to promote 
the integration of the indicator in existing private sector surveying processes. 
 
The proposed approach is developed with the aim to ensure that the analysis is context specific. The use 
of an independent assessment would provide a safeguard against collusion of interests and prevent the 
legitimising of rent-seeking behaviours when conditions for effective dialogue are not in place.  
 
The development of this indicator is an on-going exercise and the WBI, as well as the OECD, would 
welcome your comments and participation in this project. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
